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Glossary of terms
Annuity rate The annual payment received by an annuitant 
divided by the purchase price. Where the 
annual payment is increasing over time, the 
annuity rate is the annual payment in the first 
year divided by the purchase price.
Compulsory-purchase annuity An annuity which is only available to individuals 
(CPA)  who have accumulated a personal pension 
 fund, which has received tax relief. It is 
 compulsory for the individual to use some 
 (typically 75 per cent) of their pension fund 
 to secure their income, usually through 
 purchasing an annuity, but the precise details 
 are complicated and the reader should consult 
 the text for a full explanation (see also Pension 
 annuity).
Concentration ratio The fraction (usually expressed as a 
percentage) of a market which is supplied by 
a given number of firms. So if the five-firm 
concentration ratio is 70 per cent, it means 
the five largest firms provide 70 per cent of 
the sales and all of the smaller firms provide 
the remaining 30 per cent.
Defined-benefit pension A pension where the amount of pension is 
linked to the pensioner’s salary or wage. These 
pensions are typically provided by employers 
(occupational pension).
xDefined contribution pension A pension where the amount of pension 
received in retirement depends on the value 
of the pensioner’s pension fund and the 
annuity rate at the time of retirement. These 
pensions can be provided by employers or 
can be personal pensions.
Enhanced annuities Annuities sold to people with health problems 
or who have smoked. Annuity rates on such 
products tend to be higher, since the life 
expectancy of such individuals is lower.
Escalating annuity An annuity whose annuity payments rise over 
time by a fixed amount in money terms every 
year. The most common product is for the 
annuity payment to rise by three per cent per 
year.
Fair price The price of an annuity which ensures that 
the annuity provider makes zero excess profit 
after allowing for any load factors. If an 
annuity provider incurs zero load factors and 
prices annuities fairly then the money’s worth 
of the annuity would be unity.
Guaranteed annuity Any life annuity makes payments to the 
annuitant while the annuitant is alive (and 
these payments are certain). Some annuities 
may also make payments even after the 
annuitant has died (in this case the payments 
are made to the annuitant’s estate). An 
annuity with a guarantee period of five years 
will make payments for five years or until the 
annuitant dies, whichever happens later. It 
is possible to buy annuities with guarantee 
periods of up to ten years, although five years 
is most common.
Level annuity An annuity whose payments remain the 
same, in money terms, for the duration of the 
payments. This can be contrasted with a real 
(or Retail Price Index (RPI)-linked or indexed) 
annuity or an escalating annuity.
Glossary of terms
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Life expectancy The length of time that an individual can 
expect to live. In practice this is not known 
and must be estimated. Actuaries do this by 
estimating the mortality and then calculating 
the life expectancy using appropriate 
mathematical formulae.
Load factor A measure of the extent to which the money’s 
worth will be less than 100 per cent due 
to the administrative and regulatory costs 
and normal profits incurred by the annuity 
provider.
Money’s worth The expected present value of the annuity 
payments divided by the actual price paid. If 
the annuity is fairly priced then the money’s 
worth is equal to one. Sometimes this is 
expressed as 100 per cent or as £1 per £1 
purchase. In this report we express all money’s 
worths as percentages.
Mortality This is the probability of an individual dying 
in a short interval of time. Mortality increases 
with age. For a given age, mortality of men 
tends to be higher than mortality of women.
Normal profit Minimum reward required by the annuity 
provider to remain in business. 
Pension annuity An annuity which is only available to 
individuals who have accumulated a personal 
pension fund, which has received tax relief 
(see also Compulsory-purchase annuity).
Price of an annuity The amount of premium necessary to purchase 
an annuity paying £1 per year. The price is the 
reciprocal of the annuity rate. (Also referred 
to as premium or consideration.)
Purchase-life annuity (PLA) An alternative name for an annuity purchased 
in the voluntary annuity market.
Real (or RPI-linked or indexed) An annuity whose payments rise over time in 
annuity  line with some measure of inflation.
Glossary of terms
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Term structure of interest rates If money is borrowed or lent then it will be 
repaid at a point in the future called the term. 
It is common for payments in the future with 
different terms to have different interest rates. 
The term structure refers to the information 
on all of the different interest rates at a point 
in time for different terms. If these interest 
rates are plotted on a graph with the term on 
the horizontal axis, then the resulting graph 
is called the yield curve.
Voluntary annuity An annuity purchased freely in the purchased 
life market. Annuity rates for such annuities 
are typically lower than for annuities in 
the pension annuity market. The annuity 
payments from voluntary annuities are taxed 
differently from pension annuities. 
Glossary of terms
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Abstract
This report examines a time series of pension annuity rates in the UK for the 
period 1994 to 2007. The report computes the money’s worth of annuities and 
finds that, on average, the money’s worth over the sample period for 65-year 
old males has been 90 per cent, and for 65-year old females has been a similar 
but slightly larger 91 per cent. Taking into account load factors associated with 
annuity contracts and in comparison with other financial and insurance products 
this implies that annuities are fairly priced. However, the value of the money’s 
worth is sensitive to the assumptions made about life expectancy, and we explain 
the assumptions made about the appropriate life tables to apply to annuitants in 
the pension annuity market. There is some evidence that money’s worth has fallen 
since 2002. We discuss a number of factors that could have effected the fall in 
money’s worth, including: changes in insurance regulation; changes in industrial 
concentration; an insurance cycle; pricing of mortality uncertainty and the growth 
in the impaired lives market. 
Abstract

1Summary
Summary
In this report we construct a time series of United Kingdom (UK) pension annuity 
price quotes from 1994 to 2007 and examine whether these annuities were fairly 
priced over this period. The most important part of the analysis consists of looking 
at the changes in life expectancy for people approaching retirement and measuring 
whether this has been incorporated appropriately in annuity prices. This analysis 
is complemented by a discussion of changes in the market for annuities over the 
period. 
The conventional methodology for valuing annuities is to calculate the ‘money’s 
worth’ statistic, which should equal 100 per cent when annuity providers have no 
administrative costs and are making no profits: in practice the money’s worth is 
typically less than 100 per cent due to the presence of administrative costs and the 
need for annuity providers to make ‘normal profits’ (i.e. a reasonable return for 
the company). The sum of the costs and normal profit is called the ‘load factor’. 
If the money’s worth plus load factors were less than 100 per cent, this would 
suggest either that firms were making excessive profits or that there was some 
other problem.
Calculations of the money’s worth rely upon important assumptions about the 
life expectancy of individuals who are purchasing annuities and who might live 
for up to another 30 or 40 years. Since life expectancy is not known it has to be 
estimated and producing appropriate estimates has been made highly difficult in 
recent years by substantial increases in life expectancy. Annuity providers do not 
provide detailed accounts of the methods they use to calculate life expectancy 
and we would not expect them to do so since some of the information they use 
is commercially sensitive. 
The period 1994 to 2007 has seen two important changes in projections of life 
expectancy: the first is simply that life expectancy has risen significantly. Because 
annuitants who live longer receive more payments, the size of each payment and 
hence the annuity rate must fall when life expectancy increases. This is a significant 
contributor to the fall in annuity rates. The second change to the life expectancy 
projections lies in the methodology and conceptual apparatus used by actuaries. 
At the beginning of the period under study, actuaries still forecasted future life 
2expectancy by using a deterministic projection method. This took no account of the 
uncertainty in the forecast. Presumably actuaries used informal methods of their 
own to price this uncertainty when setting annuity rates. Throughout the period 
actuarial science has been developing new tools for measuring the uncertainty 
attached to forecasts of life expectancy and it is likely that the increased awareness 
of uncertainty will have had an impact on annuity rates. In calculating the money’s 
worth we have made judgements about how actuaries used these theoretical 
advances in practice. 
Throughout our analysis of how the money’s worth has changed since 1994, we 
have avoided using hindsight to evaluate annuity prices. Although current data 
might allow us to know what actual death rates and life length turned out to be in 
the 2000s, we only know this with the benefit of hindsight and to calculate what 
would have been an appropriate annuity price in 1994 means that we must use 
only information available in 1994.
Between 1994 and 2007 the average annuity rate that a 65-year old man could 
obtain fell from about 11 per cent to about seven per cent. These figures are for a 
particular type of annuity (not protected against inflation and with no ‘guarantee 
period’) and for a man of a particular age, but all annuity rates have shown 
analogous falls (illustrated in Figures 5.1 to 5.3). During this period interest rates 
fell from about eight per cent to just under five per cent and this explains some of 
the fall in annuity rates.
Our conclusions are that money’s worth for the base case of a 65-year old man 
has averaged 90 per cent over the period, which represents a fair value after 
allowing for load factors, and is very good value compared with other insurance 
and financial products. The results for women are similar, with the money’s worth 
for 65-year old females averaging 91 per cent. However, there is evidence that 
the money’s worth has fallen since the year 2002. After taking into account 
changes in life expectancy the money’s worth has fallen from 94 per cent to 
88 per cent for 65-year old men (Table 6.2) and 92 per cent to 86 per cent for women 
(Table 6.4). 
There are a number of reasons why the money’s worth might have fallen. One 
obvious candidate is that annuity providers have become less competitive and are 
making larger profits. However, there are more than ten large annuity providers 
and there is no significant change in the number of annuity providers or the market 
structure, so we reject this possibility. 
Other factors are much harder to quantify. Annuities are being sold at a time 
when life expectancy is increasing quickly and annuity providers are taking on 
substantial long-term liabilities. Changes in actuarial methodology and a greater 
awareness of the risks in forecasting life expectancy are likely to have made life 
insurers more likely to price annuities cautiously. 
Summary
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The market is also changing as ‘impaired lives’ annuities become increasingly 
important. People with recognised medical conditions or who have shorter life 
expectancy due to having smoked are increasingly able to get more generous 
bespoke annuity rates. This means that the pool of annuitants buying conventional 
annuities is shifting towards being more healthy, meaning that over time, the life 
expectancy of people buying conventional annuities is tending to increase relative 
to the whole population.
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1 Introduction
A number of commentators have pointed out that annuity rates have fallen since 
the early 1990s and this fall is documented in detail in Cannon and Tonks (2004a). 
We report below that annuity rates have continued to fall since 2002 even though 
long-term bond yields, with maturities of ten years or more, have stabilised at 
around five per cent. If the fall in annuity rates had happened while everything 
else remained the same, a consequence would be that the value of annuities 
would have fallen. However, although bond yields have been stable over this 
period, there have been substantial upward revisions to projected life expectancy. 
As people live longer, a given sum of money paid for an annuity has to finance 
a longer stream of income and so income per year has to fall. This reduction in 
annuity rates is unavoidable: the relevant issue is whether the magnitude of the 
fall in annuity rates in the recent past is appropriate given the increases in life 
expectancy.
This report addresses whether the fall in annuity rates over the period 1994 to 
2007 is larger than could be justified by the fundamental changes in longevity and 
bond yields. Our analysis centres on calculations of the ‘money’s worth’ which is 
the conventional measure used by economists to determine whether annuities are 
fairly priced. To supplement our money’s worth calculation we also describe the 
annuity market and how it has changed in this period.
Our analysis starts in Chapter 2 with a brief overview of the economics of 
annuities and Chapter 3 describes the UK annuity market. In Chapter 4 we define 
the money’s worth and review existing research. Chapter 5 discusses the life 
expectancy projections and other data issues and Chapter 6 provides our money’s 
worth calculations. Chapter 7 concludes.
This paper constructs a time series of UK annuity price quotes in the pension 
annuity market from 1994 to 2007, and examines whether annuities were fairly 
priced over the period. The pension annuity or compulsory-purchase annuity (CPA) 
market annuitises wealth accumulated in tax-efficient pension savings schemes. 
We undertake a fair-pricing analysis by computing the money’s worth of the price 
quotes, meaning that we compare the present discounted value of the expected 
annuity payments with the purchase price of the annuity. 
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2 Economic theory of  
 annuities
For the purpose of this report the most important feature of an annuity is that it is 
a product making a stream of income payments and the primary determinant of 
whether a payment is made is whether or not the annuitant is alive.1 The simplest 
form of annuity consists of a single payment (sometimes called a ‘premium’ or 
‘consideration’) from the annuitant to the annuity provider and thereafter the 
annuity provider pays a constant stream of regular payments (which could be 
monthly, quarterly or annually), each of which has the same money value.
More complicated products could have the stream of payments rising over time by 
a fixed amount (an escalating annuity) or rising in line with inflation (real annuities). 
It is also possible to buy an annuity where the first five years’ payments are made 
regardless of whether the annuitant lives or dies but payments thereafter are only 
made if the annuitant is alive (a guaranteed annuity – if the annuitant dies before 
five years, the payments are made to the annuitant’s estate).2 If an annuitant dies 
before the total payments received sum to the purchase price, it is possible to have 
the difference repaid as a lump sum to the annuitant’s estate (a value protected 
annuity). A detailed description of these various products is provided in Cannon 
and Tonks (2005).
It is usual for people to buy annuities when they are in their 60s or later (since 
the probability of dying when younger than this is sufficiently low that it can be 
ignored for many purposes) and the usual purpose of an annuity is to provide a 
pension income. The incentive for individuals to accumulate savings for a pension 
1 An older nomenclature used ‘life annuity’ to refer to what we refer to as an 
annuity.  Other products, called ‘term-certain annuities’, paid a guaranteed 
stream of income regardless of whether the annuitant was alive or not. 
Throughout this report we use ‘annuity’ in the more modern sense.
2 Guarantee periods need not be for five years. Where annuities are purchased 
in the compulsory purchase market the maximum guarantee period allowed 
by Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs (HMRC) is ten years.
8in a defined contribution scheme may depend partly upon access to annuities 
in the decumulation phase of the pension plan. Yaari (1965) demonstrated in a 
life-cycle model of saving that risk-averse individuals should annuitise all of their 
capital at retirement and hence, the existence of a well-functioning annuity market 
is important for pensioners’ welfare.3
There are several reasons to believe that annuity markets may not function 
perfectly. Brown, Mitchell, Poterba and Warshawsky (2001) note that the private 
annuity market in the United States of America (USA) is small, which is inconsistent 
with agents getting large utility gains from purchasing annuities. Poterba (2001) 
and Brown (2001) suggest a number of explanations for this ‘annuity puzzle’. 
Annuities may be expensive, either due to high administrative costs for annuity 
providers (referred to as ‘load factors’) or to mis-pricing. Elderly people may prefer 
to hold their wealth in more liquid assets for precautionary reasons or because 
they wish to bequeath their wealth to the next generation. Demand for private 
annuities may be low because many people receive a state pension which is 
itself a form of annuity. Annuity markets may suffer from a particular problem 
of ‘adverse selection’, since longer-lived individuals benefit more from an annuity 
than shorter-lived individuals, and shorter-lived individuals may leave the market. 
Finally, individuals may dislike annuities for a range of other factors (not all of 
which need be fully rational). 
To identify which of these explanations are valid, Brown (2001) constructs a utility-
based measure of annuity value, and using data from retired individuals finds 
that differences in annuity equivalent wealth can partly explain the probability 
of annuitising balances in defined contribution pension plans. These results give 
some support to the basic life-cycle model of savings/consumption behaviour, 
but still leave the annuity puzzle unresolved. At the time of writing there is no 
widespread agreement among economists on the relative importance of the 
different explanations for the annuity puzzle. 
In the UK, individuals at retirement have a significant proportion of annuity 
equivalent wealth in state pension rights. The Pensions Commission (2004 [182]) 
reports that only those individuals whose labour income exceeds about £25,000 
per year have a sizeable amount of their total wealth in assets other than their 
state pension. 
We may illustrate the welfare benefits of an annuity, with recourse to a simple 
example which is explained in more detail in the Appendix. Consider the 
consumption decision of an individual i who has just retired with accumulated 
pension wealth W0, and who must now allocate this wealth over two remaining 
periods of their life (c0, c1). However, there is uncertainty over whether this individual 
will be alive in the second period: individual i has a probability p1 of surviving into 
the second period. In the absence of an annuities market, the individual chooses to 
3 Yaari’s results concern the investment of wealth more generally, but are most 
applicable to consumption in retirement.
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9allocate their consumption across the two periods according to the inter-temporal 
budget constraint:
 
 c1 = (W0 – c0)(1 + r)       (1)
 
where r is the rate of return on savings. Figure 2.1 illustrates the budget line 
in the special case of r=0, with the horizontal axis representing an individual’s 
consumption in the first period, and the vertical axis showing second period 
consumption. Any combination of consumption in each period, on the budget 
line W0W0, is feasible. It is likely that a risk-averse individual, concerned about 
the probability of surviving in each period will probably consume more heavily 
in the first period. However, this solution is inefficient for two reasons: firstly, 
consumption is not the same in each period, for those individuals that survive; 
and secondly consumption in the second period is left unconsumed for those 
individuals that die. 
Figure 2.1 Impact of an annuities market on a consumer’s budget  
 constraint
Now, suppose that an annuities market with fair priced annuities exists. Under this 
annuity contract, the individual pays an annuity premium (annuity price) (W0 - c0A) 
to an insurance company and in return, the insurance company will pay out an 
Economic theory of annuities
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income c1A  in the second period if the individual survives but will pay out nothing 
if the individual dies. This contract is fair priced if the insurance company breaks 
even, so that the price of the annuity contract equals the discounted expected 
annuity payment, (W0 - c0A) = p1c1A/(1+r). Then the budget constraint facing the 
individual becomes:
 
 p1c1A = (W0 – c0A) (1+r)       (2)
 
and the individual uses the promised annuity payment to fund second period 
consumption. Comparing equations (1) and (2), the term pt/(1+r)t can be thought 
of as the price of second period consumption, and since p1/(1+r) < 1 /(1+r), then 
the existence of an annuities market is equivalent to no annuities market but with 
lower prices of future consumption.
As can be seen in Figure 2.1, access to an annuities market increases utility by 
expanding the budget frontier, which pivots to the right and hence, a consumer is 
always better off by participating in the annuities market. This is because there is 
a cross-subsidy between the annuitants that die early and those that survive into 
the second period, allowing consumption for those that survive to be higher in 
both periods. However, suppose the insurance company sells annuities but with a 
load factor K, to reflect its costs – the price of the annuity contract will be greater 
than the discounted expected annuity payments, (W0 - c0A) = K+ p1c1A/(1+r). The 
budget constraint facing the individual with a load factor becomes:
 
 p1c1A = –K + (W0 – c0A) (1+r)      (3)
 
The introduction of the load factor will shift the budget constraint-with-annuities 
in the diagram back towards the origin. For small load factors, the gain in utility 
from accessing the annuities market will outweigh the load factor. However, for a 
sufficiently large load factor, the consumer will not want to annuitise. 
In less technical language, the existence of an annuities market allows more 
consumption in both periods – in this simplified two-period model – due to the 
cross-subsidy from those that die to those that survive. The introduction of a 
load factor representing the annuity provider’s costs reduces the benefits of the 
cross-subsidy; for sufficiently high load factors the costs to providers of providing 
annuities may more than outweigh the benefits to individuals.
The costs incurred by an annuity provider and thus included in the load factor are: 
the administration costs of sale and delivery of the annuity contracts, including 
the payments system; the transaction costs of purchasing assets, to match the 
liability incurred by the insurance company when it sets up the annuity contract, 
and all of the on-going costs of managing these assets; and the costs arising from 
the remaining risks faced by the annuity provider. The most obvious risk faced 
Economic theory of annuities
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by an annuity provider is that it has underestimated life expectancy and hence, 
has higher liabilities (in the form of annuity payments) than initially realised. This 
risk can be partially reduced through reinsurance (selling well-defined risks to 
another insurer, typically a specialist company called a reinsurer), but this itself 
involves costs. The amount of capital that must be held to cover these risks is 
regulated by the Financial Services Authority. In addition to all of these costs, the 
annuity provider has to earn a sufficient return on capital to make it worthwhile 
to undertake the business (which economists would typically denote as ‘normal 
profit’ to distinguish it from profits that were inappropriately high).
Economic theory of annuities
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3 The UK annuity market
Assessing whether annuities are fairly priced is important for public policy, since 
the UK Government has emphasised its commitment to the requirement (DWP, 
2002; HM Treasury, 2006) that at least 75 per cent of the funds in a tax-efficient 
pension scheme should be used to finance a pension income. This is referred to as 
‘securing’ an income. According to regulations laid down by HMRC, securing an 
income can be achieved either by purchasing an annuity in the ‘pension annuity’ 
market (secured income) or drawing down a tightly prescribed income from the 
pension fund (alternatively secured income). However, the requirement to secure 
an income only requires that it be secure by the age of 75, and an individual can 
choose to have unsecured income in the period between retirement and age 75. 
Unsecured income is also referred to as income drawdown.
Under HMRC rules, the amounts of the three types of allowable pension income 
that the pensioner can receive depends on the annuity rate. With secured income 
(buying an annuity) this is obvious. With an unsecured income before 75, the 
maximum amount drawn in each year is 120 per cent of the best level single-life 
annuity payment at the respective age and sex available in the pension annuity 
market (these rates are collected and published by the FSA). With alternatively 
secured income (post-age 75), it is compulsory to draw between 65 and 90 per 
cent of the best annuity rate available to someone aged 75, and payments received 
outside this range are taxed at 40 per cent.
The justification for the requirement to secure income by 75 is that savings in 
these pension plans are tax-advantaged, and that the reason for the tax relief in 
the first place is to encourage individuals to save for a pension.4 It is also important 
for individuals to have secure income which protects them against the risk of 
living longer than expected and using up all their capital. This policy has its critics, 
especially as annuity rates have fallen throughout the 1990s and makes pensioners 
susceptible to annuity rate risk. Apart from the effects this has on people retiring 
4 With unsecured income and alternatively secured income there are further 
restrictions or tax considerations for any capital sum left on the death of an 
individual: these are to discourage using unsecured income or alternatively 
secured income to effect inter-generational transfers.
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now, it may also influence potential saving behaviour of people who will retire in 
the future. 
Interest in the workings of the annuity market is high because of the increasing 
trend for pensions in the UK to be provided through defined contribution schemes, 
documented by the Pensions Commission (2004, 2005, 2006). A consequence 
of this shift, away from unfunded pay-as-you-go and funded defined benefit 
schemes, is that there will be an increased demand for life annuities, since at 
retirement the accumulated funds in the defined contribution pension scheme 
need to be converted into a pension income. A life annuity converts the retirement 
fund into an income stream payable to the annuitant until their death and hence, 
insures the individual against insufficient assets to finance consumption due to 
longevity risk.
The Pensions Commission (2006) proposed the introduction of a national 
pensions savings scheme as part of a wider package of pension reform, and these 
recommendations are being implemented in the proposed ‘Personal Accounts’ 
outlined in DWP (2006). This new pension scheme is a defined contribution scheme, 
and this will also need to be annuitised at retirement.5 Anticipating the increased 
demand for annuities in respect of its proposals, the Pensions Commission (2005) 
examined whether there is sufficient capacity in the annuity market to provide for 
the projected demand. 
The amount of new annuity business currently sold by insurance companies in 
the pension annuity market in 2005 was £8.6 billion.6 Watson-Wyatt (2003) and 
Wadsworth (2005) examine a number of scenarios for the growth of annuity 
demand over the ten-year period 2002-2012, reproduced in Table 3.1, taken from 
the Pension Commission (2005).
Table 3.1 Scenarios for the size of the annuity market, (estimated  
 annual flows: £billion)
2002 2012
Low Medium High
Individual annuities 7.2 16.6 18.1 19.7
Drawdown 2.3 5.3 5.8 6.3
Bulk buyout 1.4 1.5 35.4 128.1
Source: Pensions Commission (2005, Figure 5.16).
5 Legislation for Personal Accounts, as well as automatic enrolment and 
minimum employer contributions, completed its passage through Parliament 
in December 2008.
6 Source: Calculations from FSA Insurance Returns, Form 47 from Synthesis 
Database.
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Figure 3.1 Growth in annuity sales 1994-2006
Figure 3.1 shows the growth in annuities and income drawdown over the period 
1994-2006. In the UK there is both a compulsory (pension annuity or CPA) market 
and a voluntary (Purchased Life Annuity (PLA)) market. The pension annuity market 
refers to annuities purchased because of HMRC rules, which state that 75 per cent 
of an individual’s pension wealth (accumulated in a tax-privileged private pension) 
must be secured. By 2006, the CPA market had grown to £9.58 billion worth of 
annuity premiums. In contrast, in 2004 the PLA market only amounted to £56.4 
million worth of sales and the diagram shows that the PLA market has shrunk as the 
CPA market has grown. This suggests some substitution between compulsory and 
voluntary annuities, as people who previously purchased annuities in the voluntary 
market undertake their desired degree of annuitisation in the pension annuity 
market first. From Figure 3.1, it can be seen that income drawdown continues to 
represent a significant alternative to annuitisation. 
All of this evidence suggests that the demand for annuities will continue to rise 
substantially in the coming years and, therefore, examining the functioning of the 
annuities market is relevant and timely for public policy. 
The UK annuity market
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4 Definition of the money’s  
 worth
To calculate the fair vale of an annuity we can calculate the expected discounted 
annuity payments promised by the annuity provider, based on the annuity rates 
that we have collected, and compare this value with the actual cost. This statistic 
is called the ‘money’s worth’. It is the ratio of the expected present value of the 
flow of payments made by an annuity to the money paid for an annuity. This 
procedure has been used by Mitchell et al. (1999) to analyse the annuities market 
in the USA and by Murthi, Orszag and Orszag (1999), Finkelstein and Poterba 
(2002) and Cannon and Tonks (2004a) to analyse the UK annuity market. For a 
general discussion of the calculation of the money’s worth see the introduction to 
the collection of papers in Brown et al. (2001).
To calculate the money’s worth approach: define the annuity rate At as the annuity 
payment received by an individual per year, per £1 purchase price in year t.7 The 
expected present value of this annuity stream is called the money’s worth. For a 
level annuity with no guarantee period, this can be calculated using: 
 
 Money’s Worth
 
where πt,t+i is the probability of someone living i more periods, believed in period t. 
T is chosen so that πt,t+i  ≈ 0 and Rt,i is the appropriate discount rate in period t for 
payments received in period t + i, expressed at an annual rate.
7 It is possible for the annuity rate to depend upon the purchase price as 
discussed in Cannon and Tonks (2005).
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the money’s worth see the introduction to the collection of papers in Brown et 
al (2001). 
 
To calculate the money’s worth approach: define the annuity rate At as the 
annuity payment received by an individual made per year per £1 purchase 
price in year t.7 The expected present value of this annuity stream is called the 
money’s worth.  For a level annuity with no guarantee period, this can be 
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where ,t t iπ +  is the probability of someone living i  more periods, believed in 
period t . T  is chosen so that , 0t t Tπ + ≈ and ,t iR  is the appropriate discount rate 
in  period t  for payments received in period t i+ , expressed at an annual rate. 
  
Notice that annuitants of different ages or sexes would have different values 
of ,t t iπ +  since the probability of living a given length of time depends upon 
both age and sex.  Clearly the annuity rate tA  will also depend upon age and 
sex. 
 
We calculate the money’s worth using the term structure of interest rates at 
date t and expectations of survival probabilities ,t t iπ +  that we believe were 
available at time t.  
 
With a zero load factor, under fair pricing the money’s worth would be 
exactly equal to unity, and hence money’s worth will reflect whether 
annuities are fairly priced. However, any positive load factor will result in the 
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Notice that annuitants of different ages or sexes would have different values of 
πt,t+i since the probability of living a given length of time depends upon both age 
and sex. Clearly the annuity rate At will also depend upon age and sex.
We calculate the money’s worth using the term structure of interest rates at date 
t and expectations of survival probabilities πt,t+i that we believe were available at 
time t. 
With a zero load factor, under fair pricing the money’s worth would be exactly 
equal to unity and hence, money’s worth will reflect whether annuities are fairly 
priced. However, any positive load factor will result in the money’s worth being 
less than unity. If data were available on the size and components of the load 
factor, then it would be possible to compare the money’s worth with the load 
factor to assess the degree of fair pricing. Estimating load factors is extremely 
difficult, since nearly all annuity providers are life insurers and sell a range of 
financial products. In practice it would be complex to apportion most costs to 
the separate categories. For example, the same people who are selling annuities 
are responsible for selling life insurance and savings products as well. Even if life 
insurers had their own estimates of the costs of the separate lines of business 
they would be unlikely to reveal this information since it would be commercially 
sensitive. In the absence of information on load factors, we instead compare the 
money’s worth of annuities with similar financial and insurance products to assess 
whether annuities are fairly priced.
A number of studies have examined the extent to which annuity prices are 
actuarially fair. Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky and Brown (1999) suggest that 
the market is approximately efficient and that annuities are not actuarially mis-
priced in the USA. In their analyses of the UK annuity market Murthi, Orszag and 
Orszag (1999), Finkelstein and Poterba (2002) and Cannon and Tonks (2004a) all 
report similar results that annuities are approximately fairly priced in the UK by 
computing an annuity’s money’s worth.8
Although we are primarily interested in the pension annuity market, the absence 
of pension annuity data for some time periods in the UK and for other countries 
(where there is no pension annuity market) mean that it is necessary to consider 
results from the voluntary-purchase market as well. To get some idea of the range 
of money’s worth estimates, we consider previous results for the money’s worth 
for 65-year old men in the voluntary market. 
Finkelstein and Poterba (2002) calculate the money’s worth of voluntary annuities 
for 65-year old men to be 99 per cent, using data from a cross-sectional sample 
of annuity providers in the year 1998. In comparison, Murthi, Orszag and Orszag 
(1999) reported a figure of 93 per cent, and Cannon and Tonks (2004a) calculated 
a value of 98 per cent, in the same year. Murthi et al. (1999) also provide money’s 
8 James and Song (2001) report that annuities are fairly priced in a number of 
other countries.
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worth estimates of 100 per cent in 1990 and 92 per cent in 1994: Cannon and 
Tonks’ (2004a) analogous figures are 98 per cent and 89 per cent. Cannon 
and Tonks’ (2004a) figure of 98 per cent for 1990 is based upon the money’s 
worth calculated using the a(90) table, but using the IM80 table (which was only 
published in that year), the figure would be 103 per cent. Thus, over a period of 
eight years, using different estimates of life expectancy and using different data 
sets of annuity rates, the range of estimates for the money’s worth of just one 
type of annuity is quite large, varying from 89 per cent to 103 per cent 
Finkelstein and Poterba (2002, 2004) specifically assess the degree of adverse 
selection in annuities markets, and find evidence of adverse selection in the 
voluntary annuity market. They note that it is difficult to distinguish between 
adverse selection and passive selection (purchasers of annuities tend to be richer 
and therefore longer-lived), and in Finkelstein and Poterba (2004) recognise the 
limitations of their small sample from a single annuity provider. 
Cannon and Tonks (2004a) assess the fair-pricing of UK annuities over a much 
longer time period 1957-2002, and for data from a wide range of annuity providers. 
They report that over the whole period 1957-2002 the average money’s worth of 
voluntary annuities was 97 per cent, and conclude that annuities are fairly priced 
over this time period. Since the pension annuity market did not exist (or was very 
small) for much of this period, it is impossible to compare the two markets over a 
long time period.
Definition of the money‘s worth
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5 Data for money’s worth  
 calculations
As can be seen in Chapter 4, three data series are needed for our money’s worth 
calculations: annuity rates, interest rates and survival probabilities. In this chapter 
we discuss each data series in turn.
5.1 Annuity rate data
The only long-run time series of annuity rates for the UK is that constructed by 
Cannon and Tonks (2004b) for the voluntary annuities market for the period 
1957-2002. For much of that period the pension annuity market was very small 
and no data are available for most of the period. The data we use in the current 
analysis are quoted annuity rates for the pension annuity market provided by 
Moneyfacts from July 1994 to March 2007. The data are for various annuity 
providers for both men and women of different ages. Annuity prices are usually 
quoted in the form of an annual annuity payment of £X per £10,000 purchased, 
which we refer to as an annuity rate of X/100 per cent. 
For example, Table 5.1 reproduces annuity rates for men of different ages for a 
level annuity in March 2002. A 65-year old man could purchase an annuity for 
£10,000 from different providers: if he had chosen AXA Sun Life he would have 
received £800 per year for the rest of his life, which we would denote as eight 
per cent. Some of the annuity rates quoted are much more generous than this: 
B & CE Insurance offers £874 and BRS Smoker offers £913. However, these last 
rates would not be generally available: B & CE Insurance annuities are only open 
to construction workers and BRS Smoker annuities are only open to smokers. In 
our analysis we exclude such annuity rates and use the average of the annuity 
rates which are available to anyone.
Data for money‘s worth calculations
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Table 5.1 Example of annuity quotes (source: Moneyfacts)
Age
Company 60 65 70 75
AMP NPI 672 789 960 1,211
AXA Sun Life 698 800 951 1,160
B & CE Insurance 752 874 1,054 1,314
BRS Smoker 786 913 1,102 1,375
BRS Plus 799 938 1,146 1,444
BRS Special 822 979 1,215 1,553
Canada Life 709 809 952 1,156
Friends Provident 716 817 951 1,129
GE LIFE 652 727 836 998
GE LIFE (special) 787 926 1,130 1,428
Legal and General 722 817 947 1,121
MGM (Select) 783 899 1,064 1,317
Norwich Union 683 764 902 1,076
Pension Annuity FS 855 1,003 1,171 1,490
Prudential 724 836 999 1,234
Royal Liver 682 783 931 1,147
Scottish Equitable 696 800 939 1,133
Scottish Widows 723 830 984 1,204
Standard Life 690 788 925 1,120
Numbers show promised level annual annuity payments for males of different ages, for a 
premium of £10,000.
In most of our analysis we use the average annuity rate calculated from these data, 
although, in practice, annuitants may purchase only the higher priced annuities (in 
which case our money’s worth calculations would be biased down). We will provide 
some evidence on the improvement in the money’s worth figure from using the 
best annuity rates. Moneyfacts provide annuity quotes for level annuities without 
an additional guarantee period that pay a constant monthly income stream over 
the lifetime of the annuitant.9 Moneyfacts also publish Retail Price Index (RPI)-
linked annuities, which pay an annuity income that rises in line with the UK’s RPI 
and hence, provides protection against inflation to the annuitant in the form of an 
RPI-linked annuity. Although level annuities carry risks from inflation, according to 
Stark (2002) over 70 per cent of pension annuities purchased are of this form.
9 Moneyfacts also publish annuity quotes in the CPA market for level annuities 
with a five-year guarantee, meaning that in the event that the annuitant 
dies, the annuity income continues to be paid into the annuitant’s estate for 
five years after their death. We do not compute the money’s worth for these 
annuities.
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Figures 5.1 and 5.2 plot a series of annuity rates for men and women aged 65 
and 75 over the period 1994 to 2007 (75-year old annuity rates were only quoted 
in Moneyfacts from August 1997 and RPI-linked annuities were only quoted from 
September 1998 – in addition, two months’ data are missing). It can be seen that 
annuity prices move closely together. Figure 5.3 plots a representative annuity 
rate alongside the bond yield to show that annuity rates move in line with interest 
rates. 
Figure 5.1 Annuity rates for men in the compulsory annuity  
 market
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Figure 5.2 Annuity rates for women in the compulsory annuity  
 market
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Figure 5.3 Comparison of annuity rates with bond yields
 
It can be seen that annuity rates for men are consistently higher than for women 
of the same age; and that annuity rates are higher for both men and women 
as age increases. Age and sex are two personal characteristics that annuity-
providers condition on when quoting annuity prices, since life expectancy of 
women is higher than men, and of younger adults of both sexes is higher than 
older adults. The annuity rates on guaranteed annuities always lie below non-
guaranteed annuities, and the rates on RPI-linked annuities lie below those on 
nominal annuities. The striking aspect of Figure 5.1 to 5.3 is the extent to which 
the series move together.
Figure 5.4 documents that the number of main annuity providers during this 
period has fallen substantially for both nominal and RPI-linked annuities. In 1994 
Moneyfacts reported 23 to 25 insurance companies providing quotes, but this fell 
to about nine sets of quotes by the end of the period. The FSA website has also 
reported price quotes from about nine or ten annuity providers over the period 
2005 to 2007. 
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Figure 5.4 Number of annuity quotes in Moneyfacts
 
In addition, some of the annuity providers only supply enhanced or similarly-
restricted annuities, such as B&CE Insurance which supplies annuities to former 
construction workers and there are also special rates for smokers, called impaired-
life annuities. The number of impaired-life annuities quotes in the Moneyfacts 
database has grown from just one quote to six, partly due to the entrance of 
specialist providers such as Just Retirement (some impaired-life annuities are 
provided by companies that also provide non-impaired life annuities). 
Although the number of annuity providers quoting annuity prices in the Moneyfacts 
database has fallen, insurance companies may still be willing to provide annuities 
if contacted directly by individuals or annuity brokers, for example they will sell 
annuities to those who have built up pension savings with the company. According 
to the FSA life insurance returns 62 insurance companies sold pension annuities 
in 2005. In Figure 5.5 we reproduce the distribution of non-profit pension annuity 
sales in 2005 across the largest 23 of the 39 parent companies that sold annuities 
(since a parent company may submit more than one insurance return for its 
subsidiary companies).10 These 23 companies sold £7,398 million of CPA non-
profit annuities in 2005 out of a total of £7,433 million for this category. There 
were a small number of other categories of pension annuities sold in 2005: with-
10 Form 47, Synthesis Database.
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profit annuities (£229 million), RPI-linked (£510 million), and impaired-life (£387 
million), but these are not included in the figure.
Figure 5.5 shows that the CPA market is dominated by a small number of insurance 
companies. The number of companies in this figure implies that the five-firm 
concentration ratio is 72 per cent, with the Prudential – the largest supplier of 
pension annuities – having over 23 per cent of new business in 2005.11
Figure 5.5 Distribution of CPA annuity sales in 2005 across parent 
 companies
Comparing the providers of sales of annuities in Figure 5.5 with the list of providers 
of annuity quotes in Figure 5.4, it can be seen that our dataset contains price 
quotes from all the major sales providers.
We may also examine the pattern in the concentration ratio over time. In Figure 
5.6 we plot the six-firm concentration ratio from 1985-2005 of CPA sales. This 
figure is based on the CPA annuity sales of the individual company FSA returns, 
rather than aggregate sales across the parent companies. Ideally, an analysis of 
market concentration would use data at parent company level, but insurance 
company mergers would make it very difficult to extract the parent information 
in a particular year and thus we confine our analysis to the individual companies. 
11 The five-firm concentration ratio shows the percentage of total industry 
annuity sales contracted by the largest five annuity providers.
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Because we are analysing individual companies Figure 5.6 may understate the true 
degree of concentration, but this effect is likely to be small. For example, in 2005, 
Figure 5.6 reveals that the six-firm concentration ratio was 68 per cent (based on 
individual company returns) compared with the five-firm concentration value of 
72 per cent (based on the parent company’s returns) derived from Figure 5.5.
Figure 5.6 Six-firm concentration ratio 1985-2005 in CPA market 
 (based on individual company FSA returns)
5.2 Interest rates and the term structure
The term structure of interest rates is available on a detailed basis on the Bank of 
England’s website. The Monetary Instruments and Markets Division of the Bank of 
England estimates nominal and real yield curves for the United Kingdom on a daily 
basis. These estimates are based on yields on UK Government bonds and on yields 
in the general collateral repo market. They are constructed by fitting a smooth 
curve through data points for rates of return on Government stock of different 
maturities, as described in Anderson and Sleath (1999). However, the current 
published series were only calculated from 1999 and so these estimates would 
not have been available in this form to insurance companies pricing annuities 
contemporaneously between 1994 and 1999. Up to 1999, published yield curve 
data was available in Financial Statistics for representative Government bonds at 
five, ten and 20 years, and it would have been possible to infer rates of return on 
intermediate maturities by interpolation or on longer maturities by extrapolation. 
In Cannon and Tonks (2004a) we compared the current Bank of England term 
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structure series for 1979-2002 with the interpolated series, and found that the 
results were very similar. Therefore, in the current analysis we will rely solely on the 
Bank of England term structure series for 1994-2007. Sample interest rates are 
illustrated in Figures 5.7 and 5.8 and compared with annuity rates in Figure 5.9.
Figure 5.7 Nominal UK spot yield curves
 
Figure 5.8 Real UK spot yield curves
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What are the implications of the shape of the term structure for the pricing of 
annuities? Consider the optimal investment strategy for the annuity provider: to 
meet future liabilities a long way into the future the life insurer can either:
•	make	a	single	purchase	of	an	asset	making	a	payment	at	that	point	in	the	(long-
distant) future: when the payment is received then the funds are automatically 
available to meet the life insurer’s liability to make the annuity payment; or
•	 invest	money	short-term	and	continuously	re-invest	it	until	it	is	needed	for	the	
annuity payment.
Historically, most of the time the yield curve has sloped up: the interest rate per 
annum for payments a long way in the future is higher than for those in the near 
future. This means that the obvious strategy for a life insurer selling an annuity 
is to match annuity payment liabilities that are a long way in the future with 
financial products making payments a long way in the future. There are three 
advantages to this approach: first, buying long-dated assets has a higher rate of 
return. Second, it involves less administrative costs, since only one transaction is 
needed, rather than continuous transactions as short-term investments are rolled 
over. Third, there is no risk, since the payment in the future from a Government 
bond is certain (Government default risk is clearly negligible in the UK), while 
investing short-term and rolling over the investment is risky as short-term rates 
of return are variable. Given these advantages the FSA strongly encourages life 
insurers to match their annuity liabilities with an appropriate mix of assets with 
differing maturities and the life insurers are obliged to provide details of their asset 
portfolio in the FSA returns, which show that they do behave in this way.
For this reason it is appropriate to use the rates of return from the term structure 
to obtain the present value of annuity obligations. One slight problem arises, 
however, when the yield curve slopes down (i.e. long-term interest rates are 
less than short-term interest rates) as has been the case in the UK recently. In 
this situation, investing short-term and rolling over the investment has a higher 
expected return on average; but this is at the expense of there being higher risk. 
If this risk were sufficiently low then it might be optimal for life insurers to invest 
short-term and it would not be appropriate for us to value annuity liabilities using 
the term structure.
However, we believe it more appropriate to continue to use interest rates drawn 
from the term structure even in this situation. First, data limitations mean that 
there is little alternative: clearly there is no independent source of information on 
future short-term interest rates or the value of risk in investing short-term and 
rolling over investments rather than investing long-term (indeed, the obvious way 
to estimate these values would be to use the term structure, which brings us back 
to where we started). Second, it is not clear that life insurers have used such a 
strategy (or that the FSA would allow them to do so).
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Figure 5.9 Comparison of annuity rates with bond yields
We will use term structure projections in the computation of money’s worth in 
Section III, but first Figure 5.9 provides a comparison of annuity rates with long-
term interest rates. It compares the annuity rate for 65-year-old males with the 
UK Government ten-year bond yield.12 It can be seen that the two series clearly 
move very closely together, although the annuity rate is slightly smoother. In fact 
these two series should be linked because they are both long-term assets: indeed 
if longevity was constant and the short-term rate was not particularly variable 
then the two would differ, on average, only by a constant. On the other hand if 
life expectancy were infinite we would expect these two curves to converge. In 
addition, Figure 5.9 also plots the yield on corporate bonds from Datastream (an 
index of bonds of various qualities) and Merrill Lynch (an index of investment grade 
bonds). Finkelstein and Poterba (2004) use the yields on corporate bonds as a 
deflator rather than Government bond yields. Form 49 of the FSA insurance returns 
provides information on the types of bonds in which life insurance companies 
invest. Figure 5.10 shows that the mixture of Government bonds (approved) and 
corporate bonds (other) has shifted over time: in 1985 life insurance companies 
held five times as many Government bonds as corporates, by 2005 this ratio was 
almost one, though over most of the sample, 1989-2004, the percentage of debt 
instruments that were Government bonds lay between 60 and 70 per cent.
12 We use the ten-year Government bond as a comparison because: a) the 
term structure after ten years is relatively flat; and b) it is the longest maturity 
instrument with consistent yields on the Bank of England website.
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Figure 5.10 Type of debt instrument held by life insurance  
 companies
 
Descriptive statistics for annuity rates and bond yields are presented in Table 5.2 
for the period as a whole, and for two sub-periods. As expected, the series are 
highly correlated, but this correlation has decreased from 0.98 in the late 1990s 
to 0.57 over the last six years. The difference between the two series is falling over 
time because as life expectancy increases, the expected payment stream from an 
annuity becomes more similar to that of a conventional bond. The lower correlation 
over the latter part of the sample appears to be driven by the higher short-term 
volatility in bond yields: bond yields have become more volatile but annuity yields 
have not responded to this volatility on a month-by-month basis. The annuity rate 
was 9.9 per cent between 1994 and 2000, but had fallen to 7.2 per cent over 
the second half of the dataset for 2001-2007. Table 5.2 also reports the yields on 
corporate bonds, and this has averaged about 90 basis points above the yield on 
government bonds13. Using the corporate bond rate as the appropriate discount 
rate, or including the risk premium on corporate bonds, will therefore reduce the 
present value of annuity payments and hence, reduce the money’s worth.
13 We use the Datastream corporate bond index rather than the Merrill Lynch 
index, since the two series are highly correlated, but the Merrill series only 
started in 1997.
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Table 5.2 Time series properties on annuity and ten-year bond  
 rates
Annuity  
rate 
(%)
10-year 
Government 
bond yield 
(%)
Datastream 
corporate 
bond yield 
(%)
Difference 
in annuity 
rate and 
Government 
bond yield 
(%)
Panel A: 1994-2007
Mean 8.59 5.61 6.52 2.98
Standard deviation 1.62 1.39 1.33
Correlation 0.93
Panel B: 1994-2000
Mean 9.91 6.55 7.29 3.36
Standard deviation 1.10 1.39 1.42
Correlation 0.98
Panel C: 2001-2007
Mean 7.22 4.65 5.70 2.57
Standard deviation 0.65 0.29 0.41
Correlation 0.57
Table 5.1 presents descriptive statistics on the time series of average annuity rates, Government 
rates and corporate bond rates over the period 1994 to 2007 and for the two sub-periods.
5.3 Life expectancy
Having discussed the role of interest rates, we now turn to the behaviour of life 
expectancy over the period 1994 to 2007. Clearly annuities are (or should be) 
priced on future life expectancy, so we are dealing with past values of expectations 
about the then future (much of which is still in the future). Cannon and Tonks 
(2004a) discussed some of the issues in working out what expectations of mortality 
might have been in the past, using the actuarial tables that were available at various 
points from 1950 onwards. The period in which we are interested saw some major 
revisions to actuarial projections and this means that changes in expectations are 
the largest cause of changes in annuity rates over this period. 
Two initial issues that we need to consider are the fact that pension annuitants 
may have different life expectancy from other individuals and that life expectancy 
differs by ‘lives’ and ‘amounts’, as explained below. The life expectancy of 
pensioners is quite different from that of the population as a whole, and there 
is also considerable variation in life expectancy between the different sorts of 
pensioners for which data are available. A large quantity of data is collected by 
the Institute of Actuaries and analysed by the Continuous Mortality Investigation 
(CMI) Committee which publishes its results at regular intervals, typically publishing 
the data for four-year periods (‘quadrennia’). We follow Finkelstein and Poterba 
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(2002) and our own analysis in Cannon and Tonks (2004a) in using the CMI data. 
The CMI collects data for individuals with the following types of pension:
1 Immediate annuities, which would only be appropriate for the analysis of 
annuities purchased voluntarily in the ‘purchase life’ market.
2 Retirement annuity contracts (RACs), an early version of personal pension 
introduced in 1957 primarily designed for self-employed workers to have 
a mechanism to receive the tax privileges available to workers in company 
pension schemes.
3 Personal pensions (PPs), introduced in 1987 and for which the data set is small 
until about 1995, since most such pensions are still in accrual rather than in 
payment.
4 Life office pensions, which are company pension schemes administered by life 
insurers and for which the most comprehensive data are available.
5 Self-administered pension (SAP) schemes, ie company pension schemes, 
typically for large companies, which are run by the company without recourse 
to life offices (although they would be advised by actuarial consultancy firms).14 
The CMI has started collecting these data only very recently and hardly any 
data are available.
Summary statistics of some of these data are shown in Table 5.3, which illustrates 
the small size of the voluntary annuity market, the relatively large size of the 
RAC market and the phenomenal growth of the PP market. Table 5.3 shows the 
number of annuitants by annuity type over various quadrennia, and the associated 
death rates for each group.
14 SAP schemes are those self-administered by the company and should not be 
confused with Self-Invested Personal Pensions (SIPPs) which are a form of 
personal pension, where investment decisions are taken by the pensioner.
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Clearly, in an ideal world we would use the PP life expectancy data, since most 
people who purchase annuities in the pension annuity market are classified as 
personal pensioners by the CMI, and we would like to ensure consistency in 
the data. However, as can be seen from Panel E in the table, it is only recently 
that significant numbers of individuals have been monitored by the CMI and so 
these PP data alone could not be used reliably for projection into the future. 
Furthermore, they were first published only in 2004 (although a smaller sample 
had been available before then) and so were unavailable for most of the period. 
An alternative would be to use the RAC life expectancy, but Panel C in Table 5.3 
suggests that the death rate of such pensioners is twice as high as the death rate 
of personal pensioners (looking at pensions in payment rather than in accrual) 
and hence, the life expectancy is much lower. In fact these summary statistics 
exaggerate the difference since the average age of RAC pensioners is higher 
than PP pensioners, but differences remain even when we disaggregate the data 
by age. This difference in life expectancy may be because the two groups have 
different socio-economic characteristics. A possible explanation is that originally 
purchasers of RACs were self-employed and thus, they may have different 
characteristics from people in employment: certainly they are likely to have worked 
in different occupations and this may explain some difference in life expectancy 
(some occupations have significantly different life expectancies from others: eg 
construction workers tend to have lower life expectancy).
Since the number of RAC pensioners in accrual has fallen by 7.5 to 4.6 million 
over the period, coinciding with an increase of PP pensioners in accrual from 
1.9 to 12.9 million, it is almost certain that some individuals who would have 
taken up RACs are now taking up PPs (as we would have expected) and this 
would suggest that their life expectancies would be similar. However, there have 
also been changes in the composition of the workforce and this effect may 
be larger.
Given the problems with interpreting RAC and PP life expectancy, it seems 
prudent to follow Finkelstein and Poterba (2002) and resort to a larger and more 
consistent set of data, namely the Life Office Pensioners, of whom there were over 
one million in 1999-2002 and for whom data are available for a longer period 
of time. Use of the Life Office Pensioner data has the additional advantage that 
life expectancy is available on both a lives and an amounts basis.15 The former 
shows the life expectancy of each life (possibly more accurately, of each policy – 
if a pensioner has more than one policy then they may be counted twice). The 
latter basis re-weights the life expectancy by the size of the pension so that richer 
15 In Chapter 6 we will refer to Pensioner Male Lives (PML) as Life Office 
Pensioner data for males based on lives. Similarly, Pensioner Female Amounts 
(PFA) refers to Life Office Pensioner data for females based on amounts. The 
most recent life expectancy tables also refer to Pensioner Male Normal Lives 
(PNML) to distinguish between those people retiring at normal retirement 
age as distinct from early retirees.
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pensioners have a higher weight – unsurprisingly, life expectancy of amounts is 
longer than life expectancy of lives since richer people tend to live longer. From 
the point of view of the Life Office, what matters is the amounts measure, since 
that is what determines the profitability of the life business: from the point of view 
of a ‘typical’ pensioner, the lives basis may be more relevant in terms of the ‘value 
for money’ of the annuity.16
We now turn to the way in which actuaries have projected life expectancy over 
the relevant period. Since their projection methods have changed, this will 
involve a summary history of actuarial thinking. It is not possible to identify how 
actuaries in specific insurance companies made their projections in the past, but 
we can consult the CMI reports as a ‘best practice’ guide. At discrete intervals 
the CMI produces ‘standard tables’ usually through the medium of a CMI report, 
accompanied by a software package for calculating certain functions based on 
the mortality data.17 Recently, the CMI has started producing working papers 
to supplement the reports, partly so that information can be disseminated in a 
more timely manner (since working papers contain provisional results). In addition 
to this, reports have a semi-official status: for example, they are recognised by 
the regulatory authorities. Since working papers do not have any official status 
they are a means of promoting discussion within the actuarial profession while 
avoiding any obligation on actuaries to utilise results which are only provisional. 
The relevant tables for the sub-periods in our sample are described in Table 5.4.
Table 5.4 Data used by CMI Committee of the actuarial  
 professional organisations in the UK to calculate life  
 tables
Table Publication
Publication  
date
Based on data 
up to year
80 Table CMIR 10 1990 1982
92 Table CMIR 17 1999 1994
92 Table interim adjustments (with 
short, medium and long cohort 
assumptions) CMI WP 1 2002 1999
00 Table CMIR WP 22 2006 2002
16 However, we cannot assume that an individual with lower life expectancy 
than average will necessarily get less additional utility from purchasing an 
annuity (based on average life expectancy) than an individual with higher life 
expectancy. We discuss this later in the report.
17 We have not consulted the software package directly since it is primarily a 
tool for actuaries. So far as we are aware it is not able to produce money’s 
worth calculations, since it does not contain interest rate term structure 
data.
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Three different methodologies were used in the actuarial tables identified in Table 
5.4, and we now describe these in turn. In all cases the actuarial methodology 
relies upon the ‘mortality’, or probability of dying at a given point of time for 
someone of a given age (males and females are always treated separately). Since 
the probability of dying at age 62 is very similar to the probability of dying at age 
61, it seems reasonable to fit a smooth curve to the data (called a ‘graduation’), 
which summarises the mortality-age relationship and smoothes out idiosyncratic 
variations in the observed death rates. Differences in methodology depend primarily 
on the method of curve-fitting and how this is projected into the future. Once we 
have suitable mortality projections, it is possible to calculate the probability of the 
annuitant receiving each annuity payment and hence the money’s worth of the 
annuity. To illustrate this, suppose we treat the data in discrete annual terms, and 
write m(x,t) as the probability of dying (mortality) in year t of a person aged x.18 
Then the probability of being alive in year t+s is:
 
and the expected value of an annuity paying £1 per year is:
 
where δ(s) is the net present value of £1 s years hence.
Table 5.5 Illustration of data availability and mortality predictions
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
60     
61     
62     
63     
64     
65     
66     
67     
68     
69     
70     
Consider the mortality data available at some point in time, for example in 1995. 
If data were available up to 1994, then data would be available up to 1994 for all 
18 Typically actuaries would work in continuous rather than discrete time. For 
expositional purposes, we stick to the discrete time model.
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avoiding any obligation on actuaries to utilize results which are only provisional. 
The relevant tables for the sub-periods in our sample are described in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Data used by Continuous Mortality Investigation Committee of the 
actuarial professional organizations in the UK to calculate life tables 
Table Publication Publication 
Date 
Based on data 
up to year 
80 Table CMIR 10 1990 1982 
92 Table CMIR 17 1999 1994 
92 Table interim adjustments 
(with short, medium and long  
cohort assumptions) 
CMI WP 1 2002 1999 
00 Table CMIR WP 22 2006 2002 
 
Three different methodologies were used in the actuarial tables identified in Table 
5, and we now describe these in turn.  In all cases the actuarial methodology relies 
upon the “mortality”, or probability of dying at a given point of time for someone 
of a given age (males and females are always treated separately).  Since the 
probability of dying at age 62 is very similar to the probability of dying at age 61, it 
seems reasonable to fit a smooth curve to the data (called a “graduation”), which 
summarises the mortality-age relationship and smoothes out idiosyncratic 
variations in the observed death rates.  Differences in method logy depend 
primarily on the method of curve-fitting and how this is projected into the future.  
Once we have suitable mortality projections, it is possible to calculate the 
probability of the annuitant receiving each annuity payment and hence the 
money’s worth of the annuity. To illustrate this, su pos  we treat the data i  
discrete annual terms, and write ( )txm ,  as the probability of dying (mortality) in 
year t of a person aged x.18  Then the probability of being alive in year st +  is 
( ){ }1
0
1 ,
i s
i
m x i t i
= −
=
− + +∏  
                                                          
18 Typically actuaries would work in continuous rather than discrete time.  For expositional 
purposes, we stick to the discrete time model. 
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and the expected value of an annuity paying £1 per year is  
( ) ( ){ }1
1 0
1 ,
i ss
s i
s m x i t iδ
= −=∞
= =
⎡ ⎤− + +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑ ∏  
where ( )sδ  is the net present value of £1 s  years hence. 
 
Diagram 2: Illustration of data availability and mortality predictions 
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Consider the mortality data available at some point in time, for example in 1995.  If 
data were available up to 1994, then data would be available up o 1994 for all 
ages.  To calculate the value of an annuity for a man aged 65 in 1995 it would be 
necessary to predict the mortality for a 65-year old in 1995, a 66-year old in 1996, a 
67-year old in 1997 and so on.  In Diagram 2 we illustrate some of the cells for 
which mortality estimates would be needed with the series of obliquely adjacent 
shaded cells.  Data are only available in the cells containing a tick (9). The way 
that the 80 and 92 Actuarial Tables would have done this is as follows: they would 
start by fitting a curve to mortality data for a particular year: for example the 
yellow cells in 1992 (which indeed is the base year in the 92 Tables, hence their 
name).  By looking at the trends of mortality for up to 1994, it would make 
predictions for the curve for years 1995 and onwards and hence extract the 
relevant mortalities that would be needed. 
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ages. To calculate the value of an annuity for a man aged 65 in 1995 it would be 
necessary to predict the mortality for a 65-year old in 1995, a 66-year old in 1996, 
a 67-year old in 1997 and so on. In Table 5.5 we illustrate some of the cells for 
which mortality estimates would be needed with the series of obliquely adjacent 
shaded cells. Data are only available in the cells containing a tick (). The way that 
the 80 and 92 Actuarial Tables would have done this is as follows: they would start 
by fitting a curve to mortality data for a particular year: for example, the yellow 
cells in 1992 (which indeed is the base year in the 92 Tables, hence their name). 
By looking at the trends of mortality for up to 1994, it would make predictions for 
the curve for years 1995 and onwards and hence extract the relevant mortalities 
that would be needed.
The 80 tables used 1980 as the base year and then projected mortality rates 
forward using the following formulae:
 m(x,t + 1980) = RF(x,t)m(x,1980)
so that the mortality at a given age in a given year was the 1980 mortality reduced 
by a ‘reduction factor’ defined by:
 RF(x,t) ≡ α(x) + [1 – α(x)] × [1 – f(x)]t/20
 f(x) = 0.6
The reduction factor consists of two parts. The α(x) component determines the 
‘limiting’ reduction, ie how much the mortality is assumed to fall by in the indefinite 
future. For ages of 110 and above this is one, so that the mortality never falls at 
all: for ages of 60 and less α = 0.5 so it is assumed that eventually the mortality 
of 60-year olds would be only half that of 60-year olds in 1980. The function f 
determines how quickly the mortality is assumed to move from the 1980 value to 
the limiting value. It can be seen that the speed of adjustment is independent of 
age in the 80 tables; in the 92 tables both functions were made age dependent 
so that:
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The 80 tables used 1980 as the base year and then projected mortality rates 
forward using the following formulae: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )1980,,1980, xmtxRFtxm =+  
 
so that the mortality at a given age in a given year was the 1980 mortality reduced 
by a “reduction factor” defined by 
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The reduction factor consists of two parts.  The ( )xα  component determines the 
“limiting” reduction, ie how much the mortality is assumed to fall by in the 
indefinite future.  For ages of 110 and above this is one, so that the mortality never 
falls at all: for ages of 60 and less 0.5α =  so it is assumed that eventually the 
mortality of 60-year olds would be only half that of 60-y ar olds in 1980. The 
function f determines how quickly the mortality is assumed to move from the 1980 
value to the limiting value.  It can be seen that the speed of adjustment is 
independent of age in the 80 tables; in the 92 tables both functions were made age 
dependent so that 
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Both of these tables viewed mortality as being based on age and time. An alternative 
viewpoint is that mortality would depend upon age and cohort of birth. In Table 
5.5, the base year graduation of 1992 used data on both 60-year olds in 1992 
and 70-year olds in 1992: people born in 1932 and 1922 respectively. If mortality 
improvements were a smooth continuous process then the use of age and time 
instead of age and cohort would make no difference. However, towards the end 
of the 1990s evidence began to appear suggesting that the mortality experience 
of people born before 1926 was markedly different from people born after 1926, 
a phenomenon which was first highlighted by Willets (1999). In other words there 
was a discontinuity in the improvement of mortality and hence, using age-time 
would result in different projections from using age-cohort.
Table 5.6 Mortality predictions and cohort effects
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
60     
61     
62     
63     
64     
65      Post
66      Post
67      Pre
68      Pre
69      Pre
70     
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The 80 tables used 1980 as the base year and then projected mortality rates 
forward using the following formulae: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )1980,,1980, xmtxRFtxm =+  
 
so that the mortality at a given age in a given year was the 1980 mortality reduced 
by a “reduction factor” defined by 
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The reduction factor consists of two parts.  The ( )xα  component determines the 
“limiting” reduction, ie how much the mortality is assumed to fall by in the 
indefinite future.  For ages of 110 and above this is one, so that the mortality never 
falls at all: for ages of 60 and less 0.5α =  so it is assumed that eventually the 
mortality of 60-year olds would be only half that of 60-year olds in 1980.  The 
function f determines how quickly the mortality is assumed to move from the 1980 
value to the limiting value.  It can be seen that the speed of adjustment is 
independent of age in the 80 tables; in the 92 tables both functions were made age 
dependent so that 
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Both of these tables viewed mortality as being based on age and time.  An 
alternative viewpoint is that m rtality woul  depend upon age and cohort of 
birth.  In the illustrative table above, the base year graduation of 1992 used data on 
both 60-year olds in 1992 and 70-year olds in 1992: people born in 1932 and 1922 
respectively.  If mortality improvements were a smooth continuous process then 
the use of age and time instead of age and cohort would make no difference.  
However, towards the end of the 1990s evidence began to appear suggesting that 
the mortality experience of people born before 1926 was markedly different from 
people born after 1926, a phenomenon which was first highlighted by Willets 
(1999).  In other words there was a discontinuity in the improvement of mortality 
and hence using age-time would result in different projections from using age-
cohort. 
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To see why this matters, consider Table 5.6 and suppose, for the sake of argument, 
that people born after 1926 had substantially lower mortality than people born 
before.19 In 1992 people aged 66 and younger belonged to the lower mortality 
cohorts and people aged 67 and over to the higher mortality cohorts. The 80 and 
92 tables would make mortality projections sideways, so all mortality projections 
below the blue line would be based on people born pre-1926, so mortality 
projections for a 65-year old man buying an annuity in 1995 would be based on 
post-1926 individuals’ cohorts only for years 1995 and 1996 and thereafter on 
people born pre-1926. Ideally, the 1926 effect would allow for larger mortality 
projections for all cells in the table above the orange line.
Of course, one of the biggest problems in making such projections is the fact that 
when the 92 tables were produced there was hardly any information at all on the 
mortality of people born after 1926 during the later part of their lives. However, 
the CMI did have access to the mortality of such people in the earlier part of their 
lives, not from annuity data, but from life assurance data. Using the male mortality 
life insurance data (based on lives rather than amounts), revisions were made to 
the 92 tables which were published in 2002 and called the ‘interim adjustments’.20 
The size of the revision depended upon the size and dating of the cohort effect 
and this cohort effect was difficult to estimate precisely on the data available. 
Accordingly, three different assumptions were made and three corresponding sets 
of revisions produced, called respectively the ‘short’, ‘medium’ and ‘long’ cohort 
assumptions. The difference between these three assumptions is the point at which 
they assume that the improvement in mortality ceases to be relevant. The short 
cohort projections assume that the mortality improvements observed in the post-
1926 cohort cease to occur after 2010: the medium cohort projections assume 
2020 and the long cohort projections assume 2040. The differences between the 
medium cohort and long cohort are sufficiently far in the future that they make 
relatively little difference for immediate annuities (obviously they have much larger 
impacts for pensions still in accrual) and in our money’s worth calculations below 
we concentrate just on the short and long cohort projections.
To give some idea of the magnitude of the changes due to revisions to the 
Actuarial Tables, the life expectancy of a 65-year old man (based on the projected 
mortalities) are illustrated in the Figure 5.11, based on the PML80 and PML92 
Tables, and PML92 with the interim adjustments. Life expectancy of a 65-year old 
man was little more than 15 years in the mid-1990s and predicted to rise only 
19 Clearly every cohort has tended to show an improvement in mortality 
compared with the previous cohorts: someone born in 1925 tends to have 
lower mortality compared with someone born in 1924 and someone born 
in 1928 has lower mortality compared with someone born in 1927. The 
suggestion being made here is that the difference between the 1925 and 
1926 cohorts was much larger.
20 In producing these adjustments, the actuaries also used population data 
supplied by the Government Actuary’s Department (GAD).
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slowly: shortly after 2000 this had been revised upwards to about 22 years, a huge 
change. Also for comparison we show the life expectancy based on the personal 
pensioner males (PPM00) tables, based on the 2000 base tables and projected 
forward using the long cohort reduction factors, which suggest that personal 
pensioners have higher life expectancy than the life office pensioners.
Figure 5.11 Life expectancy of male, 65, using different mortality  
 tables
Alongside the concerns raised by the possibility of substantial cohort effects, 
actuaries have become increasingly concerned with the idea of making 
deterministic projections of mortality into the future, and have developed more 
sophisticated projection techniques, allowing for uncertainty in projections. One 
immediate consequence of this was that the 00 Tables, unlike the 80 and 92 
Tables, did not contain any suggested projections into the future at all. Instead, 
two complementary methods began to be employed to provide projections of 
mortality into the future, called p-spline and Lee-Carter. Since these methods are 
relatively complicated, we confine ourselves here to a fairly brief exposition.
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The Lee-Carter approach was first proposed by Lee and Carter (1992) who 
suggested that mortality m(t,x) in year t for age x could be modelled by:
 ln(m(t,x)) = βo(x) + βκ(x) κ(t)
where βo(x) and βκ(x) are two functions of age and κ(t) is a function of time: 
all three of these functions need to be estimated. Suppose we are prepared to 
confine ourselves to the mortality of people (either all men or all women, since the 
two sexes would be considered separately) from age 60 to 100 (41 different ages) 
over the ten-year period 1991-2000. Then one possibility would be to estimate 
the following set of coefficients:
 βo(60), βo(61),..., βo(100) 
 βκ(60), βκ(61),..., βκ(100) 
 κ(1991), κ(1992),..., κ(2000),
The total number of coefficients to be estimated is 41+41+10=92: if data were 
available for all the relevant ages in the relevant years then the total number of 
mortality observations would be 41×10=410. The 92 parameters could be estimated 
by some form of non-linear regression.
Estimating the coefficients in this way might result in very spikey estimates of the 
functions βo(x), βκ(x) and κ(t): for example even if βo(60) and βo(62) were not too 
dissimilar, βo(61) might be different from both. Therefore, the estimation method 
might try to ensure that the functions were relatively smooth. P-spline methods 
provide a method of fitting a smooth curve through the estimated functions, 
which are too complicated to explain in detail here.
The previous tables had used data to fit a curve to a cross-section of mortality 
experiences, implicitly a two-dimensional relationship. The newer methods fitted 
a three-dimensional surface to the entire data that existed up to that point in 
time and then projected this surface into the future with appropriate statistical 
confidence intervals to provide a guide to the uncertainty of the estimates. CMI 
Working Paper 20 reports the following results for two variants of the p-spline 
method of projection, one assuming cohort effects (‘Age-Cohort’) and one 
assuming no special cohort effects (‘Age-Period’). Table 5.7 shows the appropriate 
annuity rates based on the central projection of mortality and also the 95 per cent 
confidence interval.
Data for money‘s worth calculations
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Table 5.7 Implied annuity rates for 2004 under alternative  
 mortality projection methods (assuming flat term  
 structure with 4.5 per cent interest rates)
Male, 65 Female, 65
Estimate 
%
Confidence 
interval 
%
Estimate 
%
Confidence 
interval 
%
Initial Medium Cohort 7.254  6.750  
Revised Medium Cohort 7.331 6.905  
p-spline: 6.365 6.236 6.712 6.572
Age-Cohort 6.487 6.847
p-spline: 6.369 6.167 6.704 6.483
Age-Time 6.554 6.910
Source: Tables M3 and F3 in CMI WP 20 and authors’ calculations.
In Table 5.7, the Initial Medium Cohort row shows the annuity rates implied by 
the original ‘medium cohort’ interim adjustments to the 92 Tables, based upon 
an underlying 4.5 per cent interest rate (ie assuming 4.5 per cent interest rates 
at all maturities: a flat term structure); the Revised Medium Cohort row updates 
these projections to take account of the mortality data from 2003 (recall that 
the interim adjustments were calculated on data up to 2002). Using the p-spline 
methodology leads to much lower central estimates of the appropriate annuity 
rate for males (although not females), regardless of whether the cohort or time 
effect is deemed to be more important. However, the Age-Cohort estimates fit the 
data slightly better and thus, have narrower confidence intervals, which suggests 
a 95 per cent confidence interval of about one-quarter of a percentage point. The 
key point, however, is that the 95 per cent confidence interval for the annuity rate 
based on the p-spline methodology is lower – for males considerably lower – than 
that suggested by the Medium Cohort projections.
To get some idea of the importance of this we can compute an implied money’s 
worth reduction from the annuity rates. Suppose an annuity provider priced an 
annuity for a 65-year old man on the basis of the Age-Cohort p-spline method 
and a conventional money’s worth calculation were done on the resulting annuity 
rate using the assumptions of the initial medium cohort projections. Assuming a 
zero loading, then the money’s worth figure would be: 
 6.365  = 0.877 
 7.254
Thus, moving from one methodology to another could reduce the apparent 
money’s worth by just over 12 percentage points. While it is very unlikely that any 
annuity provider was doing the precise calculations underlying Table 5.7, it does 
suggest that similar sorts of analysis to model the riskiness of mortality projections 
could have reduced the money’s worth significantly.
Data for money‘s worth calculations
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6 Results
The results on the money’s worth calculations over various sub-periods of the 
data sample are presented in Tables 6.1 to 6.6 and Figures 6.1 to 6.7. The general 
evidence is that money’s worth has fallen since the year 2000, but the level of the 
Money’s Worth (MW) and the extent of the fall depend upon assumptions made 
about the appropriate life expectancy tables. However, annuities are good value.
We first provide a comparison of money’s worth based on mortality of male lives, 
using the contemporary actuarial tables discussed already (Table 6.1 and Figure 
6.1). Since it is impossible to date the precise point at which one should move 
from one life table to another we allow overlap years. The main feature of this 
graph is one which we shall find in the other graphs too: for any given life table, 
money’s worth appears to be falling over time: for example, using the PML80 
table, the money’s worth falls from 90 per cent to 88 per cent over the period 
1994 to 2000. However, on moving to the PML92 table, the money’s worth rises 
from 88 per cent to 96 per cent in 2000. Almost certainly the gradual decline we 
appear to observe when using the PML80 table is due to life insurers pricing in 
higher life expectancy and anticipating the newer mortality tables on the basis of 
private information. The only new mortality table which makes little difference is 
the 00 Table, but this is unsurprising since it follows on so quickly from the interim 
adjustments to the 92 Table.21
21 As we have noted already, the 00 Table does not have projections: to calculate 
these figures we apply the interim adjustments to the realised mortality in 
2000. This is a further reason why our two sets of projections are so close.
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Table 6.1 Money’s worth 65 year old male level CPA, lives
Year
Summary 
money’s 
worth of 
annuities PML80 PML92
PML92 
short 
cohort
PML92 
long 
cohort
PNML00 
short 
cohort
PNML00 
long 
cohort
1994 0.900 0.900
1995 0.912 0.912
1996 0.886 0.886
1997 0.901 0.901
1998 0.888 0.888
1999 0.936 0.865 0.936
2000 0.955 0.878 0.955
2001 0.916 0.916
2002 0.951 0.864 0.923 0.979
2003 0.912 0.825 0.883 0.940
2004 0.853 0.827 0.879
2005 0.863 0.838 0.894 0.835 0.891
2006 0.855 0.829 0.885 0.826 0.883
2007 0.854 0.829 0.885 0.826 0.883
Column labelled PML80 shows money’s worth calculated using life expectancy data from the 
PML 80 Tables; PML92 calculates money’s worth from the PML 92 Tables, with short and long 
cohort interim adjustments. PNML00 calculates money’s worth from the PNML00 Tables, with 
short and long cohort interim adjustments. The first column shows the summary money’s worth 
value for each year, using the appropriate life expectancy figures for the relevant years: where 
there is more than one estimate for a year, the summary column takes simple averages.
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Figure 6.1 Money‘s worth for male, 65, level annuity, using ‘lives’ 
 mortality
In Figure 6.2 we plot the money’s worth of 65-year old males using the combination 
of life tables in Figure 6.1, to give our estimate of the change in money’s worth over 
the sample. The money’s worth profile in Figure 6.2 is a summary of the money’s 
worth values for a 65-year old male from the separate actuarial assumptions in 
Figure 6.1. The money’s worth for a 65-year old male has averaged 89.9 per cent 
over the period 1994-2007. 
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Figure 6.2 Money‘s worth for male, 65, level annuity, using  
 combined ‘lives’ mortality
 
Once we allow for the discrete arrival of revised mortality projections, the decline 
in money’s worth appears to be very small and is itself uncertain because of the 
uncertainty in which mortality projections to use. If we take the interim short 
cohort adjustment as the appropriate basis for pricing annuities, the money’s worth 
falls from 90 per cent in 1994 to 83 per cent in 2007, but if we use the interim long 
cohort adjustment then the money’s worth only falls to 88 per cent. To get some 
idea of the significance of the improvement in mortality for our money’s worth 
calculations, we can consider what money’s worth we should estimate if we had 
used the oldest mortality tables throughout. If the 80 Tables were still being used 
in 2007, the apparent money’s worth would be 70 per cent, suggesting a fall in 
value of over one-fifth. Of course, it would be entirely inappropriate to use such 
a table because the cumulative effect of raised life expectancy is between six and 
nine years.
Table 6.2 and Figure 6.3 show similar results when the money’s worth is based on 
mortality by amounts. As discussed previously, richer people tend to live longer 
and so when we take an expectation of life weighted by pension size the life 
expectancy is longer and the money’s worth is higher. Using the PMA table, the 
money’s worth is 94 per cent in 1994, falling to between 87 per cent and 92 per 
cent, depending on whether one uses the short or long cohort assumption. This is 
uniformly considerably higher than for the figures obtained in the previous graph 
using the PML table. From the point of view of the life insurers’ profits, it is the 
money’s worth weighted by pension that matters and these figures suggest that 
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annuity business has not been excessively profitable. There has been a fall in the 
money’s worth but the change could be consistent with more appropriate pricing 
of the riskiness of annuities due to greater uncertainty over life expectancy.22
Table 6.2 Money’s worth 65 year old male level CPA, amounts
Year
Summary 
money’s 
worth of 
annuities PMA80 PMA92
PMA92 
short 
cohort
PMA92 
long 
cohort
PNMA00 
short 
cohort
PNMA00 
long 
cohort
1994 0.940 0.940
1995 0.953 0.953
1996 0.924 0.924
1997 0.943 0.943
1998 0.933 0.933
1999 0.993 0.910 0.993
2000 1.015 0.924 1.015
2001 0.969 0.969
2002 0.994 0.914 0.966 1.022
2003 0.953 0.874 0.925 0.982
2004 0.891 0.865 0.917
2005 0.895 0.877 0.932 0.868 0.922
2006 0.886 0.867 0.923 0.858 0.914
2007 0.885 0.866 0.922 0.857 0.913
Column labeled PMA80 shows money’s worth calculated using life expectancy data from the 
PMA 80 Tables; PMA92 calculates money’s worth from the PMA 92 Tables, with short and long 
cohort interim adjustments. PNMA00 calculates money’s worth from the PNMA 00 Tables, with 
short and long cohort interim adjustments. The first column shows the summary money’s worth 
value for each year, using the appropriate life expectancy figures based on amounts of annuities 
for the relevant years.
22 The Board of Actuarial Standards (2008) have recently issued a paper on 
the uncertainty in forecasts of mortality rates, emphasising that there is no 
consensus on the best type of model to use for deriving assumptions about 
future changes in mortality.
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Figure 6.3 Money‘s worth for male, 65, level annuity, using  
 ‘amounts’ mortality
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Figure 6.4 Money‘s worth for different ages (male, lives)
 
Table 6.3 and Figure 6.4 show the corresponding money’s worth for different ages. 
As reported in Finkelstein and Poterba (2002) it initially appears that the money’s 
worth is lower at older ages, but this ordering rather dramatically disappears or 
even reverses when using the long cohort adjustment (the short cohort adjustment, 
which is omitted from the graph for clarity, does not suggest such a reversal). It is 
also the case that at the older ages, and using the relatively optimistic long cohort 
adjustment, there has been no fall in money’s worth at all: for example for 70-year 
olds the money’s worth is 88 per cent in 1994 and 89 per cent in 2007.
Table 6.4 and Figure 6.5 illustrate similar results for women, although, 
interestingly, women always tend to have higher money’s worth, suggesting that 
the actuaries are underestimating women’s life expectancy. The money’s worth for 
a 65-year old female has averaged 90.8 per cent over the period 1994-2007. 
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Table 6.4 Money’s worth, 65-year old female level CPA, lives 
Year
Summary 
money’s 
worth of 
annuities PFL80 PFL92
PFL92 
short 
cohort
PFL92 
long 
cohort
PNFL00 
short 
cohort
PNFL00 
long 
cohort
1994 0.915 0.915
1995 0.932 0.932
1996 0.898 0.898
1997 0.925 0.925
1998 0.920 0.920
1999 0.923 0.896 0.923
2000 0.958 0.925 0.958
2001 0.924 0.924
2002 0.950 0.882 0.925 0.976
2003 0.914 0.845 0.888 0.940
2004 0.870 0.846 0.894
2005 0.871 0.846 0.896
2006 0.853 0.836 0.887 0.828 0.878
2007 0.857 0.840 0.892 0.832 0.882
Column labelled PFL80 shows money’s worth calculated using life expectancy data from the PFL 
80 Tables; PFL92 calculates money’s worth from the PFL 92 Tables, with short and long cohort 
interim adjustments. PNFL00 calculates money’s worth from the PNFL 00 Tables, with short and 
long cohort interim adjustments. The first column shows the summary money’s worth value for 
each year, using the appropriate life expectancy figures for the relevant years.
Figure 6.5 Money‘s worth for female, 65, level annuity, using 
 ‘lives’ mortality
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Table 6.5 Money’s worth 65-year old male real (RPI-linked) CPA,  
 lives
Year
Summary 
money’s 
worth of 
annuities PML80 PML92
PML92 
short 
cohort
PML92 
long 
cohort
PNML00 
short 
cohort
PNML00 
long 
cohort
1999 0.895 0.812 0.895
2000 0.860 0.778 0.860
2001 0.820 0.820
2002 0.900 0.796 0.862 0.938
2003 0.884 0.779 0.845 0.922
2004 0.806 0.770 0.841
2005 0.774 0.741 0.812 0.739 0.810
2006 0.753 0.719 0.790 0.717 0.789
2007 0.744 0.710 0.782 0.708 0.780
Column labelled PML80 shows money’s worth calculated using life expectancy data from the 
PML 80 Tables; PML92 calculates money’s worth from the PML92 Tables, with short and long 
cohort interim adjustments. PNML00 calculates money’s worth from the PNML00 Tables, with 
short and long cohort interim adjustments. The first column shows the summary money’s worth 
value for each year, using the appropriate life expectancy figures for the relevant years.
Figure 6.6 Money‘s worth for male, 65, real annuity, using ‘lives’ 
 mortality
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Table 6.5 and Figure 6.6 turn to RPI-linked or real annuities, for which we only 
have data for 1999 onwards. The money’s worth is always lower for such annuities: 
compare the money’s worth of 94 per cent for a nominal and 90 per cent for an 
RPI-linked annuity for a 65-year old man in 1999. Finkelstein and Poterba (2002) 
suggest this is due to selection effects, as longer lived people would be more 
likely to choose real to nominal annuities. However, the discrepancy has more 
than doubled since 1999: using the 92 Table with the long cohort projection the 
money’s worth are 89 per cent for nominal and 78 per cent for RPI-linked. It is 
implausible to suggest that this is entirely due to selection effects and this raises 
the question of whether other issues, such as higher costs of inflation-proofing 
annuities, are the major cause of the difference in the money’s worth.
Table 6.6 and Figure 6.7 provide the most dramatic revision to our estimates of 
the money’s worth. In our discussion of life tables we have already seen that there 
is considerable variation in the life expectancy of different groups of pensioners. 
Until this point we have continued to follow Finkelstein and Poterba in using Life 
Office Pensioner mortality to calculate the money’s worth. However, although 
members of occupational pension schemes may top up their pensions with defined 
contribution additional voluntary contributions (AVCs), these members of defined 
benefit schemes are likely to have different characteristics to those people who 
are buying a pension annuity (Cocco and Lopes, 2004; Brander and Finucane, 
2007). 
Table 6.6 Money’s worth 65-year old male level CPA, various lives  
 assumptions
Year PML92
PML92 long 
cohort RMV92
RMV92 long 
cohort
PPM00 long 
cohort
1999 0.936 1.006
2000 0.955 1.030
2001 0.916 0.981
2002 0.864 0.979 0.926 1.035
2003 0.825 0.940 0.886 0.995
2004 0.879 0.929
2005 0.894 0.945 0.946
2006 0.885 0.938 0.940
2007 0.885 0.937 0.941
Column labelled PML92 shows money’s worth calculated using life expectancy data from the 
PML 92 Tables; and from the PML 92 Tables, with short and long cohort interim adjustments. 
RMV92 calculates money’s worth from the RAC Males Lives 00 Tables, and from the RAC males 
lives 00 Tables with long cohort interim adjustments; PPM00 calculates money’s worth from the 
PPM00 Tables with long cohort interim adjustments. 
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Figure 6.7 Money‘s worth for male, 65, level annuity, using  
 different mortality tables
So in Table 6.6 and Figure 6.7 we now consider the effect of using the mortality of 
people with RACs, and for the few years that they are available, the data based on 
personal pensioners. Using these tables adds just over five pence to the money’s 
worth, suggesting that the money’s worth was actually greater than one in 2000 
and 2002. These figures suggest that annuities have been very good value for the 
typical annuitant. 
The most recent revisions to mortality projections by the actuarial profession have 
been published (in provisional form) in CMI Working Paper 20. These projections 
are not provided as a central projection but as a distribution of projections. In 
other words they attempt to model the uncertainty about the projections (as is 
conventional in the finance literature). The amount of uncertainty shown by these 
projections suggests that the 95 per cent confidence interval for annuity prices (the 
reciprocal of the money’s worth) is about six per cent: ie that the money’s worth 
could be up to three per cent higher or lower than the central projection. This is 
clearly a large range of uncertainty. We have not incorporated these uncertainties 
into our projections, because there is some doubt as to whether these are the 
real ranges of uncertainty – the actuarial profession itself is still looking at new 
techniques for measuring this.
As a final robustness check, we considered the sensitivity of our results to two 
separate assumptions with respect to the annuity rate and the appropriate discount 
rate. 
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So far we have used the average annuity rate quoted each month across the sample 
of annuity providers. However, these quotes may be stale or an annuity provider 
who wishes to manage the risk of their annuity book may quote uncompetitive 
rates. In addition, the open-market option means that an annuitant could obtain 
the maximum of the annuity rates quoted and, therefore, the maximum annuity 
rate quoted by a particular annuity provider each month may be a better indicator 
of the money’s worth. We repeated our money’s worth calculations for 65-year 
old males purchasing level annuities, and we used the PML92 (long) tables for the 
whole sample, and compared the money’s worth from using the average annuity 
rate with that from the maximum annuity rate. The money’s worth increased from 
an average value of 98.9 per cent to 103.4 per cent. So we may conclude that 
using the maximum annuity rate increases the money’s worth of the base-case 
65-year old males by 4.5 per cent.
As a second robustness check, instead of using the yields on Government 
bonds to calculate money’s worth, we may use the corporate bond yield as the 
appropriate discount rate. From the information in Table 5.2, we may infer that 
the risk premium on corporate bonds averaged 0.9 per cent over the sample. 
We repeated our money’s worth calculations for 65-year old males purchasing 
level annuities, and we used the PML92 (long) tables for the whole sample, and 
compared the money’s worth from discounting the average annuity rate at the 
Government bond yields with a discount rate that imposed a 0.9 per cent risk 
premium. We found that the money’s worth decreased from an average value of 
98.9 per cent to 91.6 per cent. The implication is that imposing a corporate bond 
risk premium in the discount rate reduces the money’s worth of the base-case 65-
year old males by 7.3 per cent. 
We may combine these two assumptions on: i) the best annuity rate; and ii) a 
risk premium for corporate bonds with our base estimates of money’s worth for 
65-year old males and females from Tables 6.1 and 6.4 respectively. In which 
case these robustness checks would suggest that the average money’s worth for 
65-year old males could lie between 83 and 94 per cent, and for 65 year-old 
females between 84 and 95 per cent.
Results
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7 Discussion
We conclude our analysis with a brief comparison of our money’s worth 
calculations with the money’s worth of other insurance products and then discuss 
possible explanations for the decline in the money’s worth.
7.1 Evaluation of the money’s worth
The numbers for the money’s worth of pension annuities for males have averaged 
around 90 per cent over the period 1994-2007. As we have discussed in 
Chapter 4, it is difficult to evaluate the money’s worth figure because we cannot 
obtain information on the costs of life insurers. One possible means of evaluating 
money’s worth figures is to compare the money’s worth on annuities with 
analogous figures for other forms of insurance. The Association of British Insurers 
(ABI) has provided us with estimates of the premiums paid, and the claims made 
for a number of insurance markets: motor, domestic property and commercial 
property insurance over the period 1994-2005. The ratio of the value of claims 
to premiums paid is a crude measure of the money’s worth of these insurance 
products. We plot these ratios for each year, for level annuities for 65 year-old 
males, and for the three general insurance products in Figure 7.1. It can be seen 
that the money’s worth of annuities is consistently higher than the other insurance 
products. There was only a brief period in the late 1990s when motor insurance 
was better value than annuities.
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Figure 7.1 Money’s worth of annuities and claims ratios for motor,  
 domestic and commercial property insurance
James (2000) examines the cost of investing in a variety of retail investment 
products in the UK, and finds that to get the market rate of return on £1, a 
consumer would have to invest £1.50 in a managed fund, and between £1.10 
and £1.25 in an index tracker. These figures imply a money’s worth of 66 per cent 
for a managed fund, and less than 91 per cent for a tracker. This suggests that it is 
during the accumulation phase that charges from the insurance companies have a 
significant reduction on the effective rate of return and not in the decumulation phase.
7.2 Possible explanations for the decline in the money’s  
 worth
Notwithstanding the high value for money of annuities relative to other insurance 
and financial products, the evidence in Figure 6.2, is that the money’s worth of 
annuities has fallen slightly over the sample. We now discuss various factors that 
could explain this recent decline: 
•	 insurance	regulation;
•	 concentration	in	the	insurance	industry;
•	 insurance	cycle;
•	 pricing	of	mortality	uncertainty;
•	 impaired	lives.
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7.2.1 Insurance regulation 
An important development during the sample period has been the changes to 
life insurance regulation since 2002. Life insurers in the UK are regulated by the 
UK’s FSA, which incorporates the European Union Life Directives for the insurance 
industry. As explained in Jordon (2006) the bases of insurance regulation are 
prudential requirements, meaning that the regulations require insurance companies 
to have sufficient financial resources to provide for its liabilities. The FSA’s General 
Prudential Sourcebook GENPRU 2.1.8 implements the minimum EU standards for 
the capital resources required to be held by an insurer undertaking life business. 
These EU Life Directives set the base capital (currently) at ¤3.2 million, and the 
percentage of capital that must be set against technical reserves to cover four risk 
components: death risks; expense risks; market risks and health risks. In the case 
of annuities, the amount of capital set aside to cover liabilities is a total of four per 
cent of the mathematical reserves. 
Anticipating a move to a more risk-sensitive EU regulatory approach in the proposed 
Solvency II, and also because a number of events specific to the UK’s insurance 
industry23, the FSA has proceeded with its own risk-based solvency requirements, 
in part anticipating the likely Solvency II rules (FSA 2003, 2005). This new regime 
may have increased the regulatory cost associated with providing annuities, by 
imposing higher levels of regulatory capital on annuity providers.
7.2.2 Concentration in the insurance industry
We have seen that in Figure 5.6, although there has been a number of mergers 
within the life insurance industry over the last ten years, industry concentration 
has not altered greatly, with the six-firm concentration ratio averaging around 
58 per cent since 1985 with no discernable trend. There is no evidence of monopoly 
pricing within the industry, and the industry has witnessed some new entrants, but 
the small number of annuity providers remains a potential cause for concern, given 
the projected increase in annuity demand reported by the Pension Commission in 
Table 3.1. The FSA comparative tables provide information on annuity rates in the 
CPA market, which ensures that consumers are kept aware of price dispersion and 
can use the open-market option to obtain the best annuity rates. 
7.2.3 Insurance cycle 
There is a wide literature referring to a phenomenon called the ‘insurance cycle’ 
(surveyed in Harrington, 2004). This refers to the tendency of insurers to increase 
their premia after periods when negative shocks have resulted in ex post losses, 
resulting in significant reductions in capital. Since it appears that life insurers 
may have been making ex post losses on annuities over some of this period, 
due to unanticipated reductions in mortality (ie when the money’s worth was 
23 Including the closure of Equitable Life, the Baird Report, the Sandler Review 
of Medium and Long-term savings in the UK, a number of high profile 
compliance failings, and the fall in equity values after 2000.
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above unity), the observed reductions in annuity rates may be an example of the 
insurance cycle.
Standard economic theory suggests that insurers would be unable to increase prices 
to recoup losses after a negative shock, due to competitive pressures. However, 
more sophisticated theories suggest that increasing premia may be rational: first, 
the negative shock may have resulted in rational updating of probabilities and 
hence, life insurers reduced their projections of mortality by more than suggested 
in the CMI reports; secondly, the negative shock would have resulted in a reduction 
in life insurers’ capital on annuities in payment which could not be replaced in the 
short-term, or which could only be replaced at relatively high cost.
7.2.4 Pricing of mortality uncertainty
We have already discussed changes in actuarial methodology and how the most 
recent estimates attempt to include both cohort effects and estimates of the 
uncertainty in mortality projections. Setting aside the issue of cohort effects, 
pricing cohort-mortality uncertainty into annuity premia would tend to result in 
lower annuity rates. For example, suppose the annuity rate was set to be actuarially 
fair based on the best, or central estimate, of future mortality rates. Then, roughly 
speaking the life insurer would make a profit about half of the time and a loss 
about half of the time (with a very small chance of exactly breaking even). In an 
ideal world, the life insurer might hedge this cohort mortality risk, but this would 
involve payment of a premium and would lower the money’s worth since, in fact, 
secondary markets for such risk are negligible, so the life insurer has to bear this 
risk.
One strategy to cover this risk would be to set an annuity rate so that the life 
insurer would be 90 per cent sure that enough funds were available to meet the 
liabilities. This would involve setting an annuity rate based not on the central 
estimate of future mortality rates, but on the 90th centile of future estimates. 
Blake, Cairns and Dowd (2007) show how appropriate centiles can be calculated 
(which they present using ‘fan charts’). The resulting annuity rate would not be 
actuarially fair but would limit the risk to the life insurer. 
During the period that we have been considering it is probable that life insurers 
have been paying more explicit attention to cohort mortality risk. Since our money’s 
worth estimates in this paper are based on central estimates, any move by life 
insurers from an actuarially-fair pricing policy to a more conservative pricing policy 
would appear as a reduction in the money’s worth.
In April 2007, the FSA sent a ‘Dear CEO’ letter to chief executives of annuity 
providers, reflecting on the debate over future annuitant longevity improvements. 
The letter recognised that companies would usually make assumptions based on 
their own mortality experiences:
Discussion
63
‘However, if this is not possible we would expect firms to consider the 
different industry views in this area and to err on the side of caution.’
(FSA Dear CEO letter, April 2007)
In other words, annuity providers, according to the regulator, should price annuities 
conservatively to reflect the risk of mortality improvements. These concerns on the 
appropriate pricing on risk, have been echoed by the Governor of the Bank of 
England in a paper submitted to the Treasury Committee explaining the turmoil in 
financial markets. The paper concludes that the 2007 credit crisis had been caused 
by financial institutions under-pricing risk:
‘The key objectives remain,…ensuring that the financial system continues to 
function effectively, including the proper pricing of risk. If risk continues to 
be under-priced, the next period of turmoil will be on an even bigger scale. 
The current turmoil, which has at its heart the earlier under-pricing of risk, 
has disturbed the unusual serenity of recent years,…’
(King, 2007 [10])
The implication is that institutions should ensure that risk is appropriately priced, 
to ensure stability of the financial system.
7.2.5 Impaired lives
According to Quinton (2003), there was an increase in the impaired life market 
of 23 per cent between 2001 and 2002. In 2005, the Synthesis database reports 
that of £8.5 billion sales of CPA annuities, only £386 million (4.5 per cent) were 
impaired life. According to Ainslie (2000), the impaired life annuity market needs 
a market share of 7.5 per cent per annum to be a viable business model, but once 
it achieves this level, it will have an impact on the profitability of the remaining 
standard model. Our estimates of money’s worth make no allowance for any 
growth in the impaired life market, since the life tables that we use are unable to 
distinguish between impaired and non-impaired lives. This growth in the impaired 
life market would have resulted in the remaining annuitants in the conventional 
market having average lower mortality. If life insurers priced this information into 
annuities, they would have been assuming lower mortality than in the standard 
tables: this could have explained a decline in our measure of the money’s worth. 
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8 Conclusions
This report has examined a time series of pension annuity rates in the UK for 
1994-2007. We computed the money’s worth of annuities, and found that on 
average the money’s worth over the sample period for 65-year old males has 
been 89.9 per cent, and for 65-year old females has been 90.8 per cent. Taking 
into account load factors associated with annuity contracts and in comparison 
with other financial and insurance products this implies that annuities are fairly 
priced. However, the value of the money’s worth is sensitive to the assumptions 
made about life expectancy, and we explained the assumptions made about the 
appropriate life tables to apply to annuitants in the pension annuity market. There 
is some evidence that money’s worth has fallen since 2002. We discussed a number 
of factors that could have effected the fall in money’s worth, including: changes in 
insurance regulation; changes in industrial concentration; life expectancy shocks 
and the insurance cycle; pricing of mortality uncertainty and the growth in the 
impaired lives market. 
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67
Appendix 
Welfare benefits of 
annuitisation
Retirement consumption problem
Consider the consumption problem of an individual i who has just retired with 
pensions wealth W0 who must allocate this wealth over two remaining periods of 
his life (c0, c1). However, there is uncertainty over whether individual will be alive 
in the second period. In the absence of an annuities market, individual i maximises 
expected utility (A1) subject to a budget constraint (A2):
 
  (A1)
Subject to:
 c1 = (W0 – c0)(1+r) (A2)
where p1 is the probability of surviving into the second period (p0=1); δ is the rate 
of time preference, and r is the rate of return on savings. The budget constraint is 
identical to a certain world case and says that initial wealth must be no less than 
the present value of consumption over the consumer’s lifetime. Solution to the 
consumption decision problem is:
 
           and
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In the special case where r = 0 and δ = 1, without annuities, the consumption solution 
simplifies to 
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Note that if p1 = 0; ie if there is no probability of living until next year, then c0 = W0 and c1 = 0; 
and consumer spends all wealth in the first period. On the otherhand if p1 = 1; ie if there 
certainty of living until next year, then c0 = c1 = W0/2, and the consumer splits consumption 
equally between the two periods. For intermediate values of p1, the individual will tilt 
consumption between today and tomorrow depending on probability of survival and degree 
of risk aversion. For example if p1 = 0.5; and γ = 1, then c0 = 2W0/3 and c1 = W0/3. So the 
individual with a 50:50 chance of living to the second period will consume more in the first 
period, and less in the second, but this is inefficient for two reasons: firstly, consumption is 
not the same in each period for those individuals that survive; and secondly consumption in 
the second period is left unconsumed for those individuals that die. 
 
Introduce fair priced annuities 
Now suppose that an annuities market with fair priced annuities exists. An annuity contract  
is offered by an insurance company to an individual such that in return for a payment (W0 - 
c0A) in the first period called the annuity premium (or annuity price) the insurance company 
will payout an income y1 in the second period if the individual survives but will payout 
nothing if the individual dies. This contract is fair priced if the insurance company breaks 
even, so that the price of the annuity contract equals the expected annuity payment  (W0 - c0A) 
= p1y1/(1+r). Then the budget constraint facing the individual becomes 
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In the special case where r = 0 and δ = 1, without annuities, the consumption 
solution simplifies to:
 
          and
Note that if p1 = 0; ie if there is no probability of living until next year, then c0 = W0 
and c1 = 0; and consumer spends all wealth in the first period. On the other hand 
if p1 = 1; ie if there certainty of living until next year, then c0 = c1 = W0/2, and the 
consumer splits consumption equally between the two periods. For intermediate 
values of p1, the individual will tilt consumption between today and tomorrow 
depending on probability of survival and degree of risk aversion. For example, if 
p1 = 0.5; and γ = 1, then c0 = 2W0/3 and c1 = W0/3. So the individual with a 50:50 
chance of living to the second period will consume more in the first period and less 
in the second, but this is inefficient for two reasons: firstly, consumption is not the 
same in each period for those individuals who survive; and secondly, consumption 
in the second period is left unconsumed for those individuals who die.
Introduce fair priced annuities
Now suppose that an annuities market with fair priced annuities exists. An annuity 
contract is offered by an insurance company to an individual such that in return 
for a payment (W0 - c0A) in the first period called the annuity premium (or annuity 
price) the insurance company will pay out an income y1 in the second period if the 
individual survives but will pay out nothing if the individual dies. This contract is 
fair priced if the insurance company breaks even, so that the price of the annuity 
contract equals the expected annuity payment (W0 - c0A) = p1y1/(1+r). Then the 
budget constraint facing the individual becomes:
 
 
and the individual uses the promised annuity payment to fund second period 
consumption:
 p1c1A = (W0 – c0A)(1+r) (A3)
So the budget constraint changes to the equality of wealth and the expected 
value of consumption: the individual exchanges wealth for a promise from the 
insurance company to pay out an income stream yt as long as the annuitant lives. 
The term pt /(1+r)t can be thought of as a price, and since:
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and the individual uses the promised annuity payment to fund second period consumption 
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then the existence of an annuities market is equivalent to no annuities market but lower 
prices of futures consumption. So access to annuities market increases utility by expanding 
the budget frontier. 
 
With a fair-priced annuity market the solution to the consumers’ maximisation  is 
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And again for the special case where  r = 0 and δ = 1, consumption with annuities is  
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Optimal consumption in each period, with and without annuities is illustrated in the 
diagram. 
 
 
 
We can make a number of observations from diagram 1 
 
a) With annuities, c0A  = c1A  = W0/(1+p1) ie consumption is exactly the same in each period: the 
situation of consumption smoothing. 
 
b) Annuities do not make any difference to consumption when the consumer knows for 
certain that he will live into the next period. 
 
c) We suggested above that if p1 = 0.5; and γ = 1, then c0 = 2W0/3 and c1 = W0/3. Whereas when 
annuities are available the comparable consumption profile is  c0A = c1A = 2W0/3. This case 
clearly illustrates that consumers are better off with access to annuities markets 
 
d) Even if an individual has a very low probability of surviving, he is still better off 
annuitising his wealth: with the implication that all individuals should annuitise. 
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then the existence of an annuities market is equivalent to no annuities market 
but with lower prices of future consumption. So access to an annuities market 
increases utility by expanding the budget frontier.
With a fair-priced annuity market the solution to the consumers’ maximisation 
problem is:
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And again for the special case where r = 0 and δ = 1, consumption with annuities 
is:
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Optimal consumption in each period, with and without annuities, is illustrated in 
Figure 2.1.
We can make a number of observations from Figure 2.1:
a With annuities, c0A = c1A = W0 /(1+p1), ie consumption is exactly the same in 
each period: the situation of consumption smoothing.
b Annuities do not make any difference to consumption when the consumer 
knows for certain that they will live into the next period.
c We suggested above that if p1 = 0.5; and γ = 1, then c0 = 2W0 /3 and c1 = W0 /3. 
Whereas when annuities are available the comparable consumption profile is 
c0A = c1A = 2W0 /3. This case clearly illustrates that consumers are better off with 
access to annuities markets.
d Even if an individual has a very low probability of surviving, they are still better 
off annuitising their wealth: with the implication that all individuals should 
annuitise.
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